Abstract
The growing attention to the Indo-Mediterranean reflects more than the emergence of a new economic corridor linking the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. Rather, it signals a broader transformation in the spatial organisation of international politics. This article argues that the Indo-Mediterranean should be understood as an emerging geopolitical macro-space, shaped by the ongoing transition from a predominantly Atlantic-centred international system to an increasingly polycentric global order.
Moving beyond approaches that interpret the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) primarily as an infrastructure or connectivity initiative, the article develops a broader geopolitical framework in which maritime routes, logistics, digital networks, energy infrastructure, and political partnerships become instruments through which new configurations of power are territorialised.
The analysis examines how India, the Gulf region, the Eastern Mediterranean, Southern Europe, and East Africa are increasingly forming an interconnected macro-space characterised by multiple centres of political, economic, technological, and maritime power. By proposing the Indo-Mediterranean as a geopolitical macro-space, the study contributes to the theoretical debate on the relationship between power, space, and the transformation of the international order.
Keywords: Indo-Mediterranean, Geopolitical Macro-Space, Polycentric Order, Connectivity, IMEC, Geopolitics
Introduction
The emergence of the Indo-Mediterranean as a strategic concept reflects a profound transformation in the contemporary international system. Rather than a simple expansion of an existing geographical framework or the addition of a new economic corridor, the Indo-Mediterranean embodies a broader reconfiguration of political, economic, technological, and maritime interactions, driven by the ongoing redistribution of global power.
The growing prominence of the Indo-Mediterranean should be understood within the broader context of the transition from a predominantly Atlantic-centred international system towards an increasingly polycentric order. This transition is reshaping the spatial organisation of global politics, generating new patterns of connectivity that integrate maritime routes, logistics, digital infrastructure, energy networks, production chains, and strategic partnerships into broader geopolitical configurations.
From this perspective, the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) is neither the origin nor the sole expression of the Indo-Mediterranean. Rather, it is one of the most visible manifestations of a deeper historical process through which a new geopolitical macro-space is taking shape. Building on this premise, this article proposes interpreting the Indo-Mediterranean as an emerging geopolitical macro-space. It argues that understanding this evolving configuration requires moving beyond conventional regional approaches and analysing the reciprocal relationship between power, connectivity, and the production of geopolitical space within the emerging polycentric international order.
The Transformation of International Order and the Emergence of New Geopolitical Macro-Spaces
The emergence of the Indo-Mediterranean cannot be understood as an isolated regional development or as the outcome of a single infrastructure initiative. Rather, it reflects a broader transformation of the international system, in which the redistribution of power is progressively reshaping the spatial organisation of global politics and the very architecture of international order. As international orders evolve, so too do the geopolitical configurations through which power is projected, connectivity is organised, and strategic interaction is structured.
Historical experience shows that geopolitical spaces are neither permanent nor solely determined by physical geography. Their strategic relevance varies with the prevailing configuration of political authority, economic interdependence, technological development, and military capabilities. The Mediterranean, for example, was the principal centre of political and commercial interaction in classical antiquity; the Atlantic acquired global centrality with the rise of European maritime expansion and the consolidation of the modern international system; similarly, the Indo-Pacific has emerged over the past two decades as the predominant strategic framework for understanding the redistribution of economic dynamism and maritime power towards Asia.
These examples suggest that geopolitical spaces are best understood as historically contingent political constructions, an understanding consistent with broader debates that have challenged purely territorial conceptions of international politics and emphasised the spatial dimension of political authority. International orders do not merely operate within geographical space; they actively produce their own strategic spatiality. Each historical configuration of international order generates a corresponding spatial organisation through which political authority, economic interaction, technological innovation, and strategic connectivity become territorially embedded. In this sense, geopolitical macro-spaces are not the passive settings of international politics but one of its principal historical products.
The current transition towards an increasingly polycentric international order is generating precisely such a transformation. The relative diffusion of economic capabilities, technological innovation, demographic dynamism, and political influence beyond the traditional Atlantic core has produced multiple centres of strategic initiative. Within this evolving context, connectivity assumes significance that extends well beyond the construction of physical infrastructure. Maritime routes, ports, logistics platforms, digital networks, energy corridors, submarine cables, financial mechanisms, and technological standards become essential instruments through which political actors organise space and project influence. Connectivity therefore constitutes one of the principal mechanisms through which contemporary geopolitical macro-spaces are progressively formed.
The Indo-Mediterranean should be understood within this broader analytical framework. Its emergence does not stem solely from the implementation of the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor or from the growing importance of maritime trade between South Asia and Europe. Rather, it reflects the progressive integration of multiple strategic subsystems—including the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Peninsula, the Gulf, the Red Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, and Southern Europe—into an increasingly coherent geopolitical configuration.
This perspective builds on the classical geopolitical insight that political power and geographical space are inextricably linked. However, whereas traditional geopolitical theories primarily focused on strategic regions, continental balances, and the distribution of power among states, the contemporary transformation of the international order calls for analytical categories capable of explaining the emergence of new macro-spatial configurations shaped by connectivity, technological infrastructure, transregional interactions, and multiple centres of political authority. The notion of macro-space inevitably recalls Carl Schmitt’s concept of the Großraum; unlike Schmitt’s construction, which presupposed a hegemonic power ordering the space around it, the macro-space discussed here is defined precisely by the absence of a single ordering centre.[1]
The concept of the geopolitical macro-space proposed in this article is intended as a contribution to this renewed theoretical agenda, extending contemporary geopolitical reflection on the organisation of strategic spatiality[2] by providing an analytical framework for understanding how international orders reorganise space amid polycentric transformation.
From Connectivity to Geopolitical Macro-Space: The Making of the Indo-Mediterranean
The growing relevance of the Indo-Mediterranean cannot be explained solely by the proliferation of infrastructure projects or the expansion of commercial exchanges between South Asia, the Gulf, and Europe. Rather, it reflects the progressive convergence of multiple geopolitical dynamics that are reshaping the strategic architecture of a vast transregional area stretching from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea.
Connectivity is a principal manifestation of this transformation, but it should not be confused with its underlying cause. Ports, maritime corridors, railways, energy pipelines, digital infrastructure, and logistics networks are not merely instruments that facilitate trade; they also help reorganise political influence, strategic interdependence, and regional hierarchies. In other words, infrastructure does not simply connect existing geopolitical spaces; it actively participates in constructing new ones.
At this point, a conceptual distinction is necessary. Connectivity refers to the material and immaterial networks that facilitate the circulation of goods, capital, information, energy, technologies, and people. In recent years, connectivity has become a central analytical concept for understanding the reorganisation of global interactions. By contrast, geopolitical integration denotes the political process by which such networks become embedded in stable patterns of strategic interaction, institutional cooperation, and long-term political alignment. Connectivity creates networks; geopolitical integration creates geopolitical macro-spaces. Infrastructure alone does not generate geopolitical space. A geopolitical macro-space emerges only when connectivity is transformed into a durable framework of political, economic, technological, and strategic relationships.
This distinction is analytically significant. Conventional approaches often treat connectivity as an essentially economic phenomenon, emphasising efficiency, trade facilitation, and market integration. While these dimensions remain important, they only partially explain the strategic significance of contemporary transregional corridors. The Indo-Mediterranean exemplifies this multidimensional process. Its emergence stems from growing interaction among several strategic subsystems that have historically been studied separately: the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Peninsula, the Gulf, the Red Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, and Southern Europe. Increasing maritime exchanges, energy interdependence, digital connectivity, financial cooperation, technological partnerships, and security dialogues have progressively eroded the analytical boundaries separating these regions, giving rise to a more integrated strategic environment.
Within this framework, the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), formally launched via a Memorandum of Understanding signed on the margins of the G20 New Delhi Summit in September 2023, should be understood as an expression of a broader geopolitical transformation rather than its primary cause. The corridor institutionalises and accelerates trends already reshaping the region, including India’s westward strategic projection, the Gulf monarchies’ growing geopolitical role, the renewed strategic importance of the Eastern Mediterranean, and European actors’ search for diversified economic and logistical partnerships.
The Indo-Mediterranean thus constitutes an emerging geopolitical macro-space, the coherence of which stems from the interplay of maritime geography, infrastructure development, political cooperation, technological integration, and the evolving distribution of power across Eurasia and its surrounding maritime domains.
The Indo-Mediterranean as a Polycentric Geopolitical Configuration
The emergence of the Indo-Mediterranean illustrates one of the most significant spatial consequences of the ongoing transformation of the international order. Unlike traditional geopolitical regions, whose coherence often rested on geographical proximity or institutional integration, the Indo-Mediterranean is being shaped by the interaction of multiple centres of power, whose relationships are increasingly defined by strategic complementarity rather than hierarchical dependence.
The distinction between multipolarity and polycentrism is particularly relevant in this context. Multipolarity primarily concerns the distribution of power among sovereign states and therefore remains conceptually rooted in the Westphalian understanding of international politics. It describes a system of several major state powers whose interactions determine the overall balance of power.
Polycentrism, by contrast, offers a broader analytical framework. While states remain the principal actors, the international order is increasingly shaped by the interaction of multiple centres of political, economic, technological, financial, normative, and infrastructural power across different scales. These centres include not only states but also regional organisations, transnational infrastructure networks, financial hubs, technological ecosystems, maritime corridors, and other strategic actors capable of influencing the organisation of international space.[3]
Accordingly, multipolarity concerns the distribution of capabilities, whereas polycentrism concerns the organisation of the international order and the production of geopolitical space. This evolving configuration spans a vast maritime and continental continuum linking the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Peninsula, the Gulf, the Red Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, and Southern Europe. Its coherence derives not from a single political authority or security architecture, but from the growing convergence of economic interests, technological cooperation, infrastructure development, maritime security, and diplomatic engagement among its principal actors.
Within this macro-space, India occupies an increasingly prominent position. Its sustained economic growth, demographic weight, technological capabilities, expanding naval presence, and proactive diplomatic initiatives have progressively transformed the country into one of the principal centres of the emerging polycentric order. India’s strategic engagement with the Gulf monarchies, partnerships with Mediterranean countries, and growing participation in transregional connectivity projects demonstrate an increasingly westward geopolitical orientation that complements its established role in the Indo-Pacific.
The Gulf region has undergone a profound strategic transformation. No longer viewed primarily as an energy-exporting periphery, the Gulf monarchies have become active geopolitical actors, investing in logistics, finance, advanced technologies, renewable energy, artificial intelligence, and maritime infrastructure. Their sovereign wealth funds, global investment strategies, and expanding diplomatic networks have significantly enhanced their capacity to shape the geopolitical evolution of the wider Indo-Mediterranean.
The Eastern Mediterranean and Southern Europe occupy a strategic position within this evolving configuration. Rather than marking the western terminus of Asian connectivity, they increasingly serve as active interfaces linking European markets, North African economies, West Asian energy systems, and maritime routes connecting the Mediterranean with the Indian Ocean. The growing Indian presence in Mediterranean port infrastructure—exemplified by Adani Ports’ acquisition of a controlling stake in the port of Haifa in early 2023—illustrates this evolving role. Their significance therefore derives not merely from geography but from their capacity to facilitate multidirectional political, economic, and technological exchanges.
East Africa also acquires renewed geopolitical importance within this framework. Ports, maritime infrastructure, digital connectivity, and expanding commercial relations increasingly integrate the eastern coast of Africa into Indo-Mediterranean dynamics. As maritime trade and investment intensify, East Africa is increasingly becoming an indispensable component of this broader macro-spatial configuration. These dynamics are already evident: Gulf logistics operators have invested extensively in ports along the Horn of Africa and the East African seaboard; India has framed its engagement with the western Indian Ocean through its SAGAR and, more recently, MAHASAGAR maritime visions; and the India–Italy Joint Declaration of May 2026 explicitly envisages trilateral development projects in Africa, combining India’s digital public infrastructure with Italy’s Mattei Plan.[4] Far from being on the periphery of the emerging configuration, East Africa is one of the arenas where the polycentric character of the Indo-Mediterranean will be tested.
The consolidation of this macro-space is, however, contingent rather than inevitable. The attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea since late 2023, which forced a substantial share of Europe–Asia trade to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, have exposed the vulnerability of the maritime backbone underpinning Indo-Mediterranean connectivity. The stalling of normalisation processes in West Asia following the war in Gaza has likewise slowed the political alignments that IMEC presupposes. Competing connectivity frameworks—most notably China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the European Union’s Global Gateway—alongside persistent intra-regional rivalries further complicate the emergence of a coherent strategic configuration.[5]
External great powers may equally shape its consolidation: the United States remains a central security actor in the Gulf and may seek to embed the new connectivity schemes within existing US-centred security architectures, while Russia promotes the International North–South Transport Corridor as an alternative Eurasian axis and maintains close relations with the Gulf monarchies, notably through energy coordination. These constraints do not invalidate the macro-spatial dynamics analysed here, but they underscore that geopolitical macro-spaces are political constructions whose consolidation depends on sustained agency, not on geographical destiny.
The Indo-Mediterranean should therefore not be interpreted as a geopolitical space dominated by a single hegemonic actor. Its defining characteristic is the coexistence of multiple centres of decision-making, each with distinct political priorities, economic capabilities, and strategic interests. Cooperation and competition coexist within a framework of selective interdependence that reflects the broader logic of an increasingly polycentric international order.
This emerging macro-space differs from both traditional regional systems and classical geopolitical spheres of influence. It is neither an alliance nor a homogeneous geopolitical bloc. Rather, it constitutes a flexible strategic configuration in which multiple actors simultaneously contribute to the production of geopolitical space while preserving significant degrees of political autonomy. These characteristics make the Indo-Mediterranean one of the clearest contemporary manifestations of the transition towards a polycentric world order.
Italy as a Mediterranean Strategic Interface
The emergence of the Indo-Mediterranean macro-space also invites a reconsideration of the geopolitical role of Southern Europe, particularly Italy. Traditional interpretations have often portrayed Italy as Europe’s southern frontier or as a logistical gateway between the Mediterranean and continental markets. Such perspectives, however, underestimate the broader strategic implications of the ongoing reconfiguration of the international order. Within an emerging polycentric system, Italy’s geopolitical significance derives less from its position within Europe than from its location at the intersection of multiple strategic spaces. Situated at the centre of the Mediterranean, Italy occupies a privileged position, linking the European continent with North Africa, the Balkans, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, and, via the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, the wider Indo-Mediterranean maritime system.
In this context, the notion of a strategic interface proves analytically useful. A strategic interface is more than a geographical crossroads or a logistical gateway: it designates a geopolitical space where different macro-spatial configurations intersect and interact, generating durable political, economic, technological, and security relationships. Strategic interfaces facilitate the articulation of geopolitical macro-spaces without dissolving their respective centres of decision-making. They are therefore essential to a polycentric international order, enabling differentiated forms of cooperation while preserving the autonomy of the actors involved.
This centrality is not merely geographical. It depends on the country’s capacity to participate actively in the political, economic, technological, and infrastructural networks that increasingly structure the Indo-Mediterranean macro-space. Ports, logistics platforms, digital infrastructure, energy interconnections, industrial cooperation, scientific partnerships, and maritime security all contribute to redefining Italy’s strategic role within this evolving geopolitical configuration. Relations between Italy and India take on particular significance in this context. Italy is today India’s fourth-largest trading partner within the European Union, with bilateral trade of around €14 billion in 2025.[6]
Over the past decade, bilateral cooperation has broadened beyond traditional commercial exchanges to encompass defence, maritime security, advanced manufacturing, space technologies, digital innovation, renewable energy, and higher education. The elevation of bilateral relations to a Strategic Partnership in 2023 and the adoption of the India–Italy Joint Strategic Action Plan 2025–2029 have provided this convergence with an explicit institutional framework.[7]
In May 2026, the relationship was elevated to a Special Strategic Partnership: the Joint Declaration adopted in Rome sets a bilateral trade target of €20 billion by 2029, reaffirms both governments’ commitment to IMEC—encouraging its first ministerial meeting to take concrete steps to advance the initiative in 2026—and envisages interconnected port networks through a dedicated maritime transport agreement. Significantly, the joint article signed by the two Prime Ministers for the occasion explicitly referred to the emergence of the Indo-Mediterranean as an interconnected space linking the Indian Ocean to Europe.[8] These developments reflect broader structural changes in the international system, as medium and major powers increasingly diversify their strategic partnerships beyond traditional alliance frameworks.
The Indo-Mediterranean consequently offers Italy the opportunity to develop a more autonomous and multidimensional geopolitical projection. Rather than acting exclusively within an Atlantic or European framework, Italy may increasingly contribute to consolidating a wider strategic space linking Europe with the Indian Ocean through mutually beneficial partnerships based on economic complementarity, technological cooperation, maritime security, and political dialogue.
For India, Italy is more than a European trading partner. It is one of the principal Mediterranean gateways through which relations with Southern Europe, North Africa, and the wider Mediterranean basin can be strengthened. The growing convergence of Italian and Indian strategic interests therefore illustrates how the Indo-Mediterranean is progressively fostering new patterns of cooperation that transcend conventional regional boundaries.
From this perspective, Italy should not be seen as the western endpoint of Indo-Mediterranean connectivity. Rather, it is one of the political and strategic interfaces through which the emerging macro-space acquires coherence and functional integration. Its future relevance will depend less on geographical determinism than on its capacity to formulate a long-term geopolitical strategy consistent with the evolving polycentric order.
Conclusion
The concept of the Indo-Mediterranean reflects far more than the emergence of a new geographical label or the implementation of a major infrastructure initiative. It represents one of the most significant spatial manifestations of the ongoing transformation of the international system. This article has argued that the Indo-Mediterranean should be understood as an emerging geopolitical macro-space rather than merely a corridor of connectivity linking India, the Middle East, and Europe.
The India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor is undoubtedly one of the most visible expressions of this transformation. Nevertheless, it should be understood as part of a broader historical process rather than as its origin. The Indo-Mediterranean represents neither the replacement of existing geopolitical regions nor the establishment of a new hegemonic sphere of influence. Rather, it exemplifies the emergence of a polycentric spatial order in which multiple autonomous centres interact through differentiated forms of cooperation, competition, and strategic interdependence.
The concept of the Indo-Mediterranean as a geopolitical macro-space is intended not merely as a regional category but as a contribution to a broader theoretical understanding of the evolving relationship among power, space, and international order in the twenty-first century.
Author Brief Bio: Tiberio Graziani is the Chairman of Vision & Global Trend -International Institute for Global Analyses. He currently teaches at the International Doctoral School in “Law and Social Change: The Challenges of Transnational Regulation” at Roma Tre University. He is the Editor-in-Chief of Geopolitica which is a Journal of Geopolitics and Related Matters. He is a Member of several scientific committees of academic journals, including World Affairs (India), GeoPolitica (Romania), Sicurezza e Giustizia (Italy). He is also a Member of the: Advisory Board for the Political Science Area of Link Campus University; Advisory Committee of the Degree Program in “Diplomatic, International and Global Security Studies”, University of Salerno.
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Endnotes
[1] Carl Schmitt, “The Großraum Order of International Law with a Ban on Intervention for Spatially Foreign Powers: A Contribution to the Concept of Reich in International Law (1939–1941),” in Writings on War, ed. and trans. Timothy Nunan (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), 75–124.
[2] Saul Bernard Cohen, Geopolitics: The Geography of International Relations, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009).
[3] For a cognate account of the emerging order as a “multiplex world,” see Amitav Acharya, The End of American World Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014). Whereas Acharya’s multiplex describes the coexistence of multiple actors, layers, and regional orders, polycentrism as employed here is a spatial category: it concerns the way an emerging international order produces and organizes geopolitical space.
[4] “India–Italy Joint Declaration,” Rome, May 20, 2026, which envisages trilateral initiatives with African partners in fields including digital public infrastructure, agriculture, health, education, artificial intelligence, connectivity, and renewable energy, in connection with India’s development partnerships in Africa and Italy’s Mattei Plan.
[5] On the EU–India partnership and the Global Gateway as a connectivity axis alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative, see Michele Pigliucci, “Unione Europea e India: un partenariato strategico alla sfida delle tensioni globali,” in India: A Eurasian Power, ed. Alberto Cossu and Tiberio Graziani (Callive Edizioni, 2026), 167–178.
[6] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “India–Italy Bilateral Relations,” country brief, 2026.
[7] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “India–Italy Joint Strategic Action Plan 2025–2029,” Joint Statement, November 2024.
[8] “India–Italy Joint Declaration,” adopted on the occasion of the elevation of the bilateral relationship to a Special Strategic Partnership, Rome, May 20, 2026. See also Narendra Modi and Giorgia Meloni, “Italy and India: A Strategic Partnership for the Indo-Mediterranean,” joint op-ed published on the occasion of the visit, May 20, 2026.
